The Statute of the International Court of Justice stipulates that judges shall exercise their powers impartially. We question the practicability of this statement and examine whether the voting pattern of the judges are biased. In this light, empirical research is conducted on cases adjudicated from 2005 to 2016. We find strong evidence that (1) judges favour their home States or appointing States; and (2) judges favour States that speak same majority language with their home States.
Introduction
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is one of the principal organs of the United Nations (UN) and was established in accordance with Article 7 of the Charter of the UN in 1945. 1 The ICJ Statute is the constitutional document for the ICJ, which is an integral part of the UN Charter. The ICJ accepts cases that only involve States as applicant and respondent. 2 All member States of the UN, covering almost all States in the world, are ipso facto parties to the ICJ Statue. 3 The ICJ possesses a broad jurisdiction covering all matters and all cases that State parties refer to it. 4 Most common types of cases before the ICJ include boundary dispute, use of force, property rights and aerial incidents. 5 The ICJ consists of fifteen permanent judges, each of whom shall come from a different State. 6 Usually all these fifteen judges shall sit before a particular case. 7 But there are two exceptions. One is applied when a judge is on leave (judicial vocations or periodic leaves) or prevented from attending due to illness 8 or because that he or she should not take part in the decision of a particular case for some special reason. 9 Another exception is that the ICJ may form a chamber composed of three or more judges to deal with particular categories of cases, such as labour cases and cases concerning transit and communications. 10 Notably, the form of chambers has not been commonly used by the ICJ to date. Between 2005 and 2016, only one case among thirty-two contentious cases has utilised the form of a chamber. 11 A State party can appoint an ad hoc judge if no judge of its nationality sits among the permanent judges. 12 As a result, under normal circumstances, there will be fifteen to seventeen judges sitting for an ICJ case. It is stated in the ICJ Statute that the ICJ judges, either permanent or ad hoc, shall exercise his or her powers impartially. 13 This paper is interested in whether this statement is in line with the practice. In this light, the research question of this paper is whether the voting pattern of the ICJ judges is biased. For this purpose, an empirical study is conducted. As to the structure of this paper, the second part summarises the previous literature on the same topic. On this basis, the third part introduces the methodology for this study. Relevant data are described in the fourth part and results of the empirical analysis are presented in the fifth part. In the 6.
Art. 3(1) of the ICJ Statute. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 3(2) of the ICJ Statute, in case of a judge having more than one nationality, he or she shall be deemed to be a national of the one in which he or she ordinarily exercises civil and political rights. 7.
Art. 25(1) of the ICJ Statute. 8.
Art sixth part, we discuss some possible explanations for the results that we have observed. Several conclusions are drawn in the final part.
Literature Review
A considerable amount of literature addresses the voting behaviour of international judges from the perspective of normative analysis. Some literature explores the historical development of the legal regime of national judges, especially ad hoc judges. Article 31 of the ICJ Statute sets forth the regime of ad hoc judges, as mentioned above. In fact, this provision mirrors Article 31 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), which was the predecessor of the ICJ. 14 In accordance with the preparatory work regarding the drafting process of Article 31 of the PCIJ Statute, the ad hoc judges' regime was established for the purpose of addressing the inequality between parties which might be caused when there was "upon the bench a judge of the nationality of only one of the parties to the case". 15 In this light, Lord Phillimore, a member of the Advisory Committee, stated:
it would be preferable to give a national representative to both parties, not only to protect their interests, but to enable the Court to understand certain questions which require highly specialised knowledge and relate to the differences between the various legal systems. 16 In a similar vein, several scholars have addressed the raison d'être of the national judges, especially ad hoc judges, by underlining the political necessity behind this regime. 17 In particular, it is pointed out that:
If during the deliberations it becomes apparent that, despite the best efforts of counsel for the party, the case presented by that party has not been clearly understood, the national judge is best placed to appreciate this, and…can ensure that any rejection of that approach -whether he himself favours such rejection or not -is reasoned in such a way as to reassure the party that its point of view has been understood, and that justice has been done. It is widely accepted that the above described function of the national judges, namely to ensure the full understanding of the case presented by a State party, can increase the confidence of that State party in participating in relevant international dispute settlement procedures. 19 Furthermore, some literature aims at identifying the factors influencing the impartiality of international judges. Inter alia, it is suggested that the ICJ is a "semilegal, semi-judicial, semi-political body which nations sometimes accept and sometimes not". 20 Put differently, the decisions made by the ICJ are not only based on legal considerations but also on political considerations. Besides, influential factors on judicial behaviour are summarised as including legal education and training, views on the function of law, conceptions of institutional propriety and belonging, wider external community expectations, and national or political bias. 21 In addition to normative analysis, some scholars also conduct empirical researches on this topic. Nevertheless, most empirical researches only focus on the voting behaviour of the national judges, including judges elected or appointed ad hoc, in cases where their home or appointing States are involved, namely "the extent to which national judges reach their decisions consistently with the position of their national governments". 22 These researches show that the national judges have voted in favour of his/her own government in more than 90% of the disputes. 23 As observed by William Samore, "except in the most isolated of instances, it would be unrealistic to expect that a judge of an international tribunal would ever vote against the country of his origin or nationality". 24 States. 30 We code the variables, including one dependent variable and six explanatory variables, as follows (see Table 1 .
Judge-Vote
The dependent variable. In accordance with Article 95(1) of the 1978 Rules of Court, the ICJ judgements shall contain the number and names of the judges constituting the majority. 31 Consequently, these judgements are able to show clearly each judge's vote on each issue. 32 The value of this variable equals to one if the judge rules in favour of the applicant and zero otherwise. Usually judges are asked to decide on more than one substantive issue in one case. Under such circumstances, we code judges as voting in favour of the applicant if they join the majority or concurrence which upholds everything or significant requests that the applicant seek, or if they dissent when the majority opinion does not support the significant requests that the applicant seeks. 33
App-Nationality
An explanatory variable. The value of this variable equals to one if the applicant and judge's home State or appointing State match and zero otherwise. The data on nationality of applicants and judges can be accessed from the ICJ judgements.
Res-Nationality
An explanatory variable. The value of this variable equals to one if the respondent and judge's home State or appointing State match and zero otherwise. The data on nationality of respondents and judges can be accessed from the ICJ judgements. We obtain the data on democracy score for each State from the database of Polity IV 35 which ranges from -10 (authoritarian) to 10 (democracy). 36 The democracy score for each country corresponds to the Polity IV the data from Polity IV, the democracy score range that it gave was from 0 (authoritarian) to 10 (democracy). This is because the indicator we use in this research is POLITY, other than DEMOC used by Poser and de Figueiredo. The reason for using the indicator POLITY is that 'the POLITY score was added to the POLITY IV data series in recognition of its common usage by users in quantitative research and in the overriding interest of miantaining uniformity among users in this application'. In this sense, the POLITY score is a better way of conducting empirical research. See M. Marshall, T.R. Gurr & K. Jaggers, 'Polity IV Project: Dataset Users' Manual', available at: <www. systemicpeace. org/ inscr/ p4manualv2016. pdf> (last visited 25 November 2011).
Democracy
score for the year when the judgement was made. 37 In accordance with this formula, if the value of the democracy measure is bigger than zero (positive value), it means that the judge's State has a closer democracy score to the applicant. When the value is smaller than zero (negative value), then the judge's State has a closer democracy score to the respondent. Otherwise (zero value) the democracy score of the judge's State is neither closer to the applicant nor the respondent. 42 We mainly adopt two methods in this study. One is the difference tool. Assuming the first hypothesis is true, the ratios of party judges and nonparty judges voting in favour of applicants (or respondents) shall be close. Hence, we use the difference between the aforesaid ratios to examine whether a judge is voting in a biased way under the influence of the variable nationality. Normally, in a case, only two of the judges are party judges and the rest (normally thirteen to fifteen judges) are nonparty judges. If both party judges are biased, we expect that their votes can cancel each other out and thus their bias will not have an important impact on the final outcome. Therefore, it is also of vital importance to examine whether nonparty judges are biased. With respect to the second hypothesis, we divide the nonparty judges into two subgroups: nonparty judges whose home States or appointing States share the same cases the ICJ judges had voted on substantive issues. 45 Thus, we select these eighteen cases as our study subject for the purpose of researching the voting pattern of ICJ judges.
Wealth
or similar political, economic or cultural levels with applicants (or respondents), and other nonparty judges. Assuming the second hypothesis is true, the ratios
Party Judges
As mentioned above, 'party judges' are those who are either nationals of (in the case of permanent judges) or appointed by (in the case of ad hoc judges) applicants or respondents. In eighteen cases, all applicants and respondents have their party judges except in the 2009 Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) case, the applicant, Costa Rica, did not have its party judge. 46 As a result, there are thirtyfive party judges in total, with seventeen of them nationals of or appointed by applicants and eighteen nationals of or appointed by respondents. In concreto, only two of the thirty-five party judges are permanent judges of the ICJ, 47 while the remaining thirty-three party judges are ad hoc judges. In this sense, in terms of party judges, this research has more explanatory power on the voting pattern of ad hoc judges rather than permanent party judges. Our data on the voting pattern of party and nonparty judges are provided in Table 2 . As shown in Table 2 , nonparty judges vote for applicants or respondents about 50% of the time. By contrast, party judges vote for applicants that appoint them about 88% of the time. Hence, the probability of a judge voting in favour of the applicant increases by 37 percentage points when the applicant State appoints the 
Nonparty Judges
We intend to study whether the voting pattern of nonparty judges is biased. For this purpose, we examine the difference of the voting behaviour between two subgroups of nonparty judges: nonparty judges whose home States or appointing States share the same or similar political, economic or cultural levels with applicants (or respondents), and other nonparty judges. On the basis of the null hypothesis, we hypothesise that the voting pattern of nonparty judges would not differ regardless of whether their States have same majority language as, or share closer political level or economic level to the applicant (respondent) or not. The raw data of the variable language (app-language and res-language) are binary and thus can be presented in the form of a descriptive table. By contrast, the raw data of the variables democracy and wealth are a series of discrete values and thus will be presented in a different form. Table 3 reports results for the voting pattern of nonparty judges whose States speak the same majority languages as applicants (respondents) and other judges. Judges whose States have different majority languages from applicants (respondents) vote in favour of applicants (respondents) about 50% of the time. When judges' States speak the same majority languages as respondents, the probability of these judges voting in favour of respondents increases by 32 percentage points. However, the change is different when it comes to the situation when judges' States speak same majority languages as applicants. As indicated by Table 3 , there are sixteen judges whose States speak same majority languages as applicants, and only seven out of these sixteen judges vote for applicants. Under this circumstance, the probability of judges voting for applicants decreased by 9 percentage points. In order to figure out the explanation for this result, we have checked the voting details of the remaining nine votes, and found that six of them actually happened when States of judges, applicants and respondents all speak the same majority languages. 52 Apparently in accordance with the collected data at present, most judges favour respondents when such circumstance occurs. But it cannot be interpreted to undermine the conclusion that judges of the ICJ vote in favour of party States that speak the same majority languages as their States. Figure 1 shows the relationship between democracy alignment and the probability of a judge favouring the applicant. The y-axis shows the probability of a judge voting in favour of an applicant. The x-axis shows the extent of the match between the democracy score of the judge's State with the applicant: the bigger the number, the closer the extent of the match. The observations are divided evenly among each value (0-5) on the x-axis (about 39 per value). 53 Figure 1 is in line with the predicted relationship described in our null hypothesis. A judge is not more likely to vote for an applicant when the judge's State has a closer democracy score to that applicant. Likewise, Figure 2 shows the relationship between wealth alignment and the likelihood of a judge voting in favour of the applicant. The y-axis shows the probability of a judge voting in favour of an applicant. The x-axis shows the extent of the match between the wealth level of the judge's State with the applicant: the bigger the 52. This is the difference between the variable language and the variable nationality. The State of a judge cannot be the same State as the applicant and the respondent at the same time. But the State of a judge, the applicant and the respondent can speak the same majority language. 53. For this purpose, we first sort the entries of the variable democracy_measure from the smallest to the largest. Then we code the first group of thirty-nine entries as value 0, the second, third, fourth and fifth group of thirty-nine entries as values 1, 2, 3 and 4, and in the end the sixth or last group of forty entries as value 5. number, the closer the extent of the match. The observations are divided evenly among each value (0-5) on the x-axis (about 39 per value). 54 Figure 2 endorses the predicted relationship described in our null hypothesis. A judge is not more likely to vote for an applicant when the judge's State has a closer wealth level to that applicant.
Results
In this section, the result of several regressions will be presented. As indicated by Posner and de Figueiredo, the main obstacle for the regression is multicollinearity: the variables, namely democracy, language and wealth, are to some extent related. 55 To address this problem, we also run several regressions with different groups of independent variables. Table 4 contains the results of 54. For this purpose, we first sort the entries of the variable wealth_meas-ure from the smallest to the largest. Then we code the first group of thirty-nine entries as value 0, the second, third, fourth and fifth group of thirty-nine entries as values 1, 2, 3 and 4, and in the end the sixth or last group of forty entries as value 5. 55. Posner and de Figueiredo, above n. 26, at 618. these regressions, describing each variable's standardised coefficients, with P-values in parentheses. 56 As can be seen from the regression results, the first row, namely app-nationality variable, is highly significant in all different regressions, and its coefficients are consistent with the above observation that a judge who is the national of or appointed by the applicant is more likely to vote for the applicant. By contrast, the second variable, i.e. res-nationality, is significant in all regressions except when the variable language (including variables app-language and res-language) are involved (regressions (5) and (8) in Table 4 ). In terms of the variable democracy, it has significance when considered alone (regression (2) in Table 4 ). However, when this variable is combined with the nationality variable (including variables app-nationality and resnationality), the democracy variable loses its significance. And when the multiple-variable regression is 56. There are eight regression results of (1) nationality; (2) democracy; (3) nationality and democracy; (4) language; (5) nationality and language; (6) wealth; (7) nationality and wealth; and (8) nationality, democracy, language and wealth. Among them, (1), (3), (4) and (5) are calculated on each variable independently, with the purpose of finding each variable's coefficient and significance; (2), (4) and (6) are calculated with the nationality variable since nationality is the most significant variable according to the previous research and is the basis of democracy, language and wealth as well; and (8) is the final overall result. conducted, the democracy variable lacks any significance (regression (8) in Table 4 ). Similarly, with respect to the variable language (including variables app-language and res-language), it also has significance when considered alone (regression (4) in Table 4 ), but when this variable is combined with the variable nationality, the variable app-language loses its significance and the significance of the variable res-language is weakened (regression (5) in Table 4 ). A similar situation also exists in the multiple-variable regression (regression (8) in Table 4 ). As to the variable wealth, no significance is shown in all regressions, no matter calculated alone in regression (6), or taken into account other variables in regressions (7) and (8).
Discussion
On the basis of the above results, we feel confident to conclude that the variable nationality does play a role in Table 4 Regression Results of Nationality, Democracy, Language and Wealth regressions. 57 On this basis, we can further conclude that the significance of the variable nationality is consistent across all time, from 1946 to 2016. In concreto, the probability of party judges favouring applicants or respondents increase by around 40 percentage points across all time when compared with nonparty judges (Table 2) . It is worth noting that 33 out of 35 party judges (94%) involved in this empirical research are ad hoc judges. Hence, the above conclusion about the voting behaviour of party judges has more explanatory power on ad hoc judges rather than permanent judges. Put differently, it can be inferred from the results of this research that nationality does play an important role in influencing the voting pattern of ad hoc judges. Besides, as mentioned above, some scholars conclude that ad hoc judges are more likely to favour the appointing States than permanent judges. Considering most of the party judges involved in this research are ad hoc judges, the data of this research are insufficient to confirm or negate the above conclusion. With respect to the variable democracy, it does not show any significance in Figure 1 when assessing the voting pattern of nonparty judges alone. By contrast, when taking into account both party and nonparty judges together, this variable shows significance in Table 4 (regression (2)). The latter analysis differs from the former in the sense that the latter adds the voting data of party judges into discussion. Accordingly, it is suggested that the significance in regression mainly results from party judges. As concluded above, the variable nationality does influence the voting pattern of party judges. Considering that the variables nationality and democracy are co-related, the difference in significance between these two results is understandable. This argument is also supported by regressions (3) and (4) in Table 4 , in which democracy loses significance when combined with the nationality variable. To sum up, the democracy variable has little impact on the voting pattern of nonparty judges. Nonparty judges from democratic States do not necessarily favour democracies over non-democracies, and vice versa. This is contrary to the results of Posner and de Figueiredo's research, which found that the democracy variable had significance in the voting behaviour of nonparty judges. 58 The variable language, on the other hand, also exerts influence on judges' decision-making. As indicated by regression (4) in Table 4 , both the variables app-language and res-language show a significant connection with the dependent variable judge-vote. Inter alia, the variable res-language has a higher correlation. This finding is contrary to that concluded by Posner and de Figueiredo. In their research, the variable app-language showed stronger significance. 59 Such contrast may result from different cases selected. Another interesting point deserving attention is regression (5) in Table 4 . The regression results show that when both variables nationality and language are taken into account, the variables res-nationality and app-language lose their significance, and the significance of the variable res-language becomes weaker. A possible explanation for this finding may be that the variables nationality and language are highly co-related. For example, when a judge' State is the same as the applicant (or respondent), that judge's State, for sure, speaks the same majority language as the applicant (or respondent).
Regarding the remaining variable wealth, the results shown in Figure 2 as well as in Table 4 practically speaking, in order to make his/her voice or the additional information he/she provides heard and considered by other judges, it is very important that the judge ad hoc acts as a full member of the Bench. 65 Moreover, as shown by the results of this empirical research, the voting behaviour of nonparty judges is also influenced by other factors such as culture. Following the same rationale of the above suggestion, these nonparty judges should also be deprived of the right to vote. Consequently, none of the judges, including party and nonparty judges, should be entitled to vote, which is apparently ridiculous and impractical. Hence, the suggestion of depriving a judge ad hoc of the right to vote is untenable. Meanwhile, the current appointing mechanism of ad hoc judges should be reformed to lessen the interference of the States concerned. 66 The fifteen permanent judges of the ICJ are recommended by State parties to the ICJ Statute and elected for nine-year terms by the concurrent action of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the UN. 67 By contrast, ad hoc judges are simply designated by a State to the dispute. 68 Though the State concerned is recommended to give preference to those who have been nominated as candidates for permanent judges of the ICJ, this preference is not obligatory and in practice, the State has often bypassed the candidate list. 69 In this light, some scholar proposes to reinforce the appointing mechanism of ad hoc judges through the following reforms: each member State would be obliged to file a list if three candidates for the position of judge ad hoc at the Registry of the Court before a dispute has risen. In case a judge ad hoc is subsequently needed, the Registry can contact the first candidate without further interference of the state concerned. Should the first candidate be unavailable, the registrar would be able to contact the second and third candidates. In addition, member states could be urged not to appoint a judge ad hoc when neither party to a dispute is represented on the Bench by a regular judge. 70 Regardless of whether this proposal will be accepted in practice by States parties to the ICJ Statute, this proposal tends to weaken the function of ad hoc judges, which, as mentioned above, is for the purpose of ensuring the full understanding of the case presented by a State party and further increasing the confidence of that State in participating in the judicial proceedings. Taking a step back, a normative question raised here is whether the biased voting behaviour of the judges, including party and nonparty, will lead to the unfair interpretation or application of law. The key to answering this question is to determine whether such voting behaviour is a proper exercise of the discretion power of a judge. It is widely accepted that the judges' discretion is inevitable. Both legal positivists and legal naturalists acknowledge that judges are entitled to exercise their discretion power during judicial procedures. 71 Nevertheless, a judge's discretion is definitely not "free to reach any result he pleases as long as he is able to give some legally plausible argument for it". 72 Instead, a judge "must give the decision that he honestly thinks is best, and reasons which he sincerely regards as the best reasons he is able to give". 73 A question naturally arises as to which factors should be taken into consideration by a judge when deciding what constitutes the best decision and the best reasons. In this regard, Thomas M. Franck proposed as below:
since [judgements are] made by men who, in their attitudes, proclivities, and intellectual tendencies, are to a significant degree products of the environments that related them to local and national systems of social values, there can be no man impartial in disputes between States. 74 As shown by this empirical research, the voting pattern of party or nonparty judges is influenced by the political or cultural factors. In this sense, these two factors can be regarded as the influential factors that a judge takes into account when exercising his/her own discretion power. It is understandable that judges are trained to best exercise their discretion, and that such training is inevitably associated with certain political and cultural contexts. This research cannot draw any conclusion regarding whether judges consciously vote in a biased pattern. It is possible that a judge votes for a State party to the dispute that happens to share similar politics or culture with his/her home State without any intention. Consequently, given that discretion is allowed in all legal systems including the system of international law, the influence exerted by the political or cultural factors on the voting behaviour of the judges does not necessarily lead to the unfair interpretation or application of law. Instead, the coming-into-play of these factors may be considered as a proper exercise of the discretion power of a judge.
Conclusion
The data provide strong evidence that judges of the ICJ favour applicants that appoint them, and that judges favour respondents that speak same majority languages as their States, and weaker evidence that judges favour respondents that appoint them, and more weakly or no evidence that judges favour applicants that speak same majority languages as their States or that judges are influenced by democracy and wealth alignments. These results suggest that political and cultural factors do play a role in influencing the decision-making of the ICJ judges. Nevertheless, to avoid doubt, this research has not shown that judges are consciously biased. All it has shown is that their voting pattern is not in line with the manners described by the null hypothesis. A judge does not necessarily consciously decide to vote in favour of a State that is the same or similar to his or her own State. It is also possible that when a State party needs to appoint a person as a judge in the ICJ, the State may tend to appoint a person with legal opinions in favour of its part at the beginning. All in all, this research aims at providing an empirical perspective on the voting pattern of ICJ judges. It does not reveal that the cases would have been decided more impartially if all the validated bias triggers had been prohibited. In the end, this research does not suggest that the biased voting pattern of the ICJ judges will necessarily lead to unfair interpretation or application of law.
